Extraordinary Demands Require Extraordinary Justifications

Who Can Ask Free Citizens to Fight?

As discussion grows about rearmament, military preparedness and the possibility of future conflict, an awkward question confronts Britain.

Who can legitimately demand extraordinary sacrifice from free citizens?

For generations Britain relied upon assumptions that no longer seem secure. Citizens broadly trusted Parliament, accepted unwritten constitutional conventions, and believed they belonged to the same national project. Today social trust is weaker, political polarisation deeper, and agreement on fundamental constitutional principles less certain. Yet it is precisely now that governments may seek greater powers, higher taxation, and perhaps even new forms of national service.

Extraordinary demands require extraordinary justifications.

Britain has never properly explained where such justifications come from.

The Problem of Sovereignty

Every political community must answer a simple question:

Why should I obey?

The traditional British answer was that sovereignty resides in Crown-in-Parliament.

But this merely moves the problem.

Why should Parliament be sovereign?

Why should the Crown be sovereign?

Why should either possess authority over free individuals?

Modern democracies often answer that sovereignty belongs to “the people”. Yet people do not possess a single will. Majorities are not infallible, and counting votes does not transform millions of individuals into a single mind.

The question remains:

Why should one group of individuals possess authority over another?

Starting From the Individual

The most convincing answer begins with the individual.

Individuals possess rights and liberties prior to the state. Government does not create these rights. It exists because individuals cannot flourish entirely alone.

People need:

• security;
• arbitration of disputes;
• protection from violence and fraud;
• infrastructure;
• economic cooperation.

The state is therefore a cooperative project created by sovereign individuals.

But cooperation always carries a risk. The moment authority is delegated, individuals become vulnerable to decisions made by other people.

The real constitutional question therefore becomes:

Why should citizens trust those exercising power on their behalf?

Trust and the Common Bond

Political order ultimately rests upon trust.

Not blind trust. Not unconditional trust. But sufficient trust that fellow citizens broadly share my interests, values and conception of the common good.

For much of British history this trust was supported by common institutions, common traditions, constitutional liberties, economic reciprocity and a shared sense of belonging.

People disagreed, often fiercely. Yet they generally accepted that their opponents remained participants in the same national enterprise.

Being outvoted by a fellow participant in a shared project feels fundamentally different from being governed by strangers.

Why Ethnic Nationalism Is Not Enough

Shared ancestry can help generate trust. Historically it often correlated strongly with shared culture, since families transmitted language, customs, social norms and historical memory.

But ancestry is neither sufficient nor decisive.

People of identical ancestry frequently possess radically different values. Some of the deepest political disagreements in modern Britain occur between people who share ancestry, language and history.

Conversely, many people of different ancestry may share the same constitutional loyalties and civic commitments.

Moreover, the United Kingdom has never been a single homogeneous ethnic nation. It has always been a union of English, Scottish, Welsh and historically Irish traditions.

Ethnic nationalism may be viable in highly homogeneous societies. It cannot realistically be retrofitted onto an established multinational and multi-ethnic society without conflict.

Nor should anyone wish to pursue the coercive means that would be required.

The Need for a Thick Civic Nationalism

If ethnic nationalism is not viable, what remains?

A civic nationalism that is stronger than mere passport-holding.

A genuine civic nation built around:

• freedom of speech;
• freedom of conscience;
• equality before the law;
• private property;
• constitutional liberty;
• civic responsibility;
• shared institutions;
• common endeavour.

The nation becomes an intergenerational community.

Most members enter through birth and inheritance. Others enter through incorporation and adoption into the civic culture. What matters is not ancestry alone, but participation in the common project.

Shared Services, Shared Risks, Shared Rewards

Political communities are strongest when citizens feel:

We contribute together.

We benefit together.

We face risks together.

Schools, hospitals, roads, courts, pensions and public infrastructure are not merely practical institutions.

They are institutions of solidarity.

Their importance lies partly in creating the feeling that citizenship is a relationship of reciprocal obligation rather than a collection of private transactions.

The strongest civic nationalism is therefore built less on slogans than on shared institutions and shared endeavour.

Citizens are more willing to trust one another when they genuinely believe:

We are all in this together.

Rights as the Safeguard

Trust, however, is never enough.

That is why constitutional rights are indispensable.

The less I trust the majority, the more important become:

• freedom of speech;
• due process;
• private property;
• freedom of conscience;
• equality before the law.

These rights are not merely personal privileges. They are safeguards against the inevitable failure of trust.

A free society rests upon two forms of security:

1. Trust that fellow citizens broadly share my interests and values.
2. Constitutional guarantees that protect me when they do not.

The two are not alternatives. They are complements.

Extraordinary Demands

This principle becomes most important when governments seek extraordinary powers.

Ordinary government requires ordinary justification.

Extraordinary government requires extraordinary justification.

Conscription.

Emergency powers.

Mass mobilisation.

Confiscatory taxation.

Restrictions on liberty.

These are not routine exercises of authority. They touch directly upon life, liberty and property.

The greater the sacrifice demanded, the greater the legitimacy required.

Governments cannot simply assume consent. They must persuade.

Broad consultation, public scrutiny, constitutional safeguards and substantial consensus become essential.

The burden of proof lies with those demanding sacrifice, not with those asked to provide it.

Britain’s Constitutional Problem

For two centuries Britain largely muddled through without a written constitution. It relied upon convention, institutional trust and a broad consensus about the rules of the game.

Those conditions are weakening.

We disagree increasingly about:

• freedom of speech;
• national identity;
• the role of the state;
• constitutional authority;
• the limits of executive power.

At precisely the moment when governments may seek greater powers and greater sacrifice, we are least certain about who constitutes the political community and where sovereignty ultimately resides.

That is not a sustainable arrangement.

Britain no longer needs more constitutional ambiguity. It needs less.

We need answers to questions we have avoided for centuries:

Who are we?

What do we owe one another?

Where does sovereignty reside?

What rights stand beyond political majorities?

What sacrifices can legitimately be demanded of citizens?

Until those questions are answered, Britain’s constitutional settlement will remain fragile.

The age of muddling through may finally be coming to an end.